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Ever since Pierre Kazansky and Paul Reinsch published their classic works on international organizations in the 
early twentieth century2, international organizations have been regarded as not just promoting community 
interests, but as actually embodying the community interest. International organizations are conceptualized as 
taking care of things that states cannot or will not do on their own, and have come to be associated with the 
global common good. They are conceptualized as representing the common interest in a world of otherwise 
egoistic states, and the ultimate expectation has always been, in Nagendra Singh’s wonderfully evocative 
phrase, to contribute to the ‘salvation of mankind’.3 International organizations were created to perform 
collective tasks and make the world a better place, eventually leading, through ‘networks of interdependence’4 
and the ‘logic of ramification’, to a ‘working peace system’.5 Swords were to be turned, as the Bible has it, into 
plowshares6, and it was this sentiment that prevailed for a long, long time. 
That picture of organizations as harbingers of world peace was never fully plausible. For one thing, it would be 
decidedly odd for nasty states to set up entities to work for the common good, and in this light it is no 
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coincidence that rationalist theories of international relations and international law have always had a hard 
time fitting international organizations into their models, and could eventually only start to do so by 
downplaying both the ‘bad’ to be expected from states and the ‘good’ to be expected from international 
organizations. On such a conception, organizations turned not into the opposite of states, but into their 
instruments: powerful states could use organizations to serve their individual purposes.7 
Second, whereas Reinsch had written about some thirty entities which all had a reasonably clearly defined 
public task (public health, regulating means of communication, economic standardization), following the 
writings of Sayre the notion of international organization started to mushroom beyond control.8 Sayre, writing 
only a decade after Reinsch, saw fit to discuss all sorts of imperialist ventures as international organizations, 
providing them with a degree of legitimacy they might otherwise never have acquired. For him, entities such as 
the Chinese river commissions, or international police forces operative in the Balkans and North Africa, were as 
fine examples of international organizations as, say, the Universal Postal Union or the various health bureaux. 
And ever since, the notion of international organization has come to encompass essentially any form of inter-
state cooperation beyond the purely incidental, including entities devoted to military matters (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization - NATO) and entities that are essentially interest groupings, such as the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), or the European Union 
(EU). While such organizations may possibly contribute to the global public good, they will by definition 
prioritize the good of their member states – as their respective charters make clear.9 
It also became clear that the more active international organizations became, the more they would engage in 
the sort of practices that would attract criticism. The International Tin Council (ITC) experienced a meltdown 
and became insolvent, leaving a number of creditors in the dark, and the activities of the United Nations (UN) 
and the EU in administering international territory suggested that when acting in governmental fashion, these 
entities could potentially be just as bad as the states they were supposed to displace. Horror stories arose 
regarding the way the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was running refugee camps10, 
or about the decidedly authoritarian management of food crises in the Horn of Africa by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO)11, or about nepotism and corruption looming large in the UN Educational, 
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Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).12 Whatever else such events and occurrences may have 
signified, they signified at the very least that the salvation of mankind would not automatically involve 
international organizations. International organizations, it transpired, could actually do wrong, and for the last 
three decades international organizations lawyers and academics have been struggling to develop ways of 
handling such situations, and how to integrate this insight into the prevailing legal theoretical framework.13 
During this time, it has also become increasingly clear that there is a theoretical issue at the heart of the 
discipline of international institutional law, an issue inherent perhaps in the study of law generally. On the one 
hand, heuristically it makes perfect sense to utilize a broad, open concept of international organization. When 
studying international organizations, one might as well include inter-state interest groups such as the EU or 
OPEC; military alliances such as NATO; judicial organs such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as all kinds of informal creatures, from G20 to Basel Committee and 
from the Paris Club to the Council of the Baltic Sea States. When it comes to studying patterns of inter-state 
cooperation, there is little point in excluding some merely on the basis of some random a priori marker.14 
On the other hand, when it comes to treating international organizations not as object of study, but as subjects 
of law (and, importantly, beneficiaries of legal arrangements), then all of a sudden some distinctions would 
appear desirable. Surely, international courts cannot, like other organizations, be seen as exercising delegated 
powers – at least not without jeopardizing the independence of the judiciary. While it is one thing to grant tax 
immunities to organizations working for global health, should one really apply the same benefits to an 
organization whose mission is to make oil-rich states even richer? And while it is one thing to make benefits 
acceptable to entities that are willing to subject themselves to international law including fundamental 
ordering mechanisms such as sovereign equality, how desirable is it to offer legal protection to clubs that 
otherwise do not wish to be bound by international legal rules and deny their existence takes place on the 
plane of law altogether?15 
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Hence, some academic international organizations lawyers16 are torn between two logics: a heuristic logic, 
according to which a broad concept of international organization is useful, and a normative logic, according to 
which such a broad conception may be questionable. Traditionally, this has remained hidden from sight: 
following the idea that organizations are the harbinger of world peace, the swords-turned-plowshares 
contributing to the salvation of mankind, the heuristic and normative logics become one. On such an idea, 
there should be as many international organizations as possible, and all of them should enjoy immense 
benefits and derive protection from the body of legal rules applicable to them. This has become calcified into a 
theory of functionalism, and it is no exaggeration to claim (and I will substantiate this below) that functionalism 
has become ideology. 
Still, if it is no longer entirely plausible to consider international organizations as embodying the community 
interest, the question remains whether and how international organizations can be expected to help promote 
the community interest. I will address in what ways organizations are thought to contribute to the community 
interest, followed by a brief discussion of functionalism as ideology. Before going there, however, it might be 
useful to explain why coercion is not the most obvious way in which international organizations can contribute 
to the community interest, despite a recent study suggesting as much. 
 
II. Coercive Organizations? 
 
The most obvious way, one would think, for international organizations to promote the community interest 
would be through the task of policing whether states and others live up to their obligations under international 
law, and indeed, to some extent this takes place – provided, of course, those obligations are themselves 
emanations of the community interest. Hence, theoretically, two relevant questions are raised. First, how can 
coercion or enforcement (I will speak of coercion, both because it is a more evocative term, and because 
coercion is the harder case: it assumes enforcement even against the wishes of the entity concerned) be 
philosophically justified, and second, is the existence of a community interest a conditio sine qua non? 
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In a recent study, the philosopher Carmen Pavel argues forcefully that international organizations can help 
enforce community obligations by coercing states, and by this she means, grosso modo, the organization’s 
member states.17 By far the best part of the book is her justification of intervention by international institutions 
in the domestic affairs of states. These states, so she suggests, derive their sovereignty from their citizens, and 
should not act in such a way as to violate the basic rights of those citizens. As federalism makes clear, 
sovereignty can be divided. Pavel’s study is a compelling plea to divide sovereignty between states and their 
international institutions, in such a manner that those institutions can be called on to intervene when 
necessary. In doing so, she provides, one might say, a philosophical justification for the responsibility to protect 
doctrine: citizens provide states with certain tasks, and delegate guardianship over those tasks to international 
organizations.18 
While she has valuable things to say about the role of institutions and the relevance of how they are designed, 
nonetheless when it comes to the practical implementation she faces some stubborn obstacles. For one thing, 
it proves difficult to come up with examples of institutions that actually can exercise coercion: her main two 
candidates are both problematic. One the one hand, she (understandably) often refers to the ICC, but to 
consider the ICC an international organization on a par with, say, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) or the World 
Health Organization (WHO) seems to be stretching things. As noted, it is conceptually awkward to treat judicial 
institutions in terms of the type of principal-agent theory prevailing in the law of international organizations: 
this would be difficult to reconcile with the independence of the judiciary.19 
Second, there are repeated references to the Security Council. Here, the pedant may point out that the Council 
is not best seen as an independent international organization. Legally speaking, it is one of the organs of the 
UN, and lacks legal personality. This may sound innocuous, but it has been authoritatively suggested that only 
organizations with international legal personality can incur responsibility under international law.20 Hence, on 
this point Pavel’s reasoning leaves a gap, in that it presupposes that the Security Council can stand in for the 
UN and represents the UN. 
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The third entity Pavel mentions is NATO, and here a different issue becomes visible, as NATO’s coercive powers 
are primarily, perhaps exclusively, exercised over non-member states. Hence, it would take an additional 
argument or line of thinking to justify why NATO would have the authority to operate in, say, Afghanistan 
(which, to be sure, is not among its member states). Pavel’s divided sovereignty argument does little work 
here, as it cannot be meaningfully suggested that the Afghan population has mandated NATO to intervene in 
Afghan affairs. Pavel’s justification covers intervention in the organization’s member states (thus, NATO would 
be allowed to intervene in Norway, say, or Canada), but cannot on its own justify intervention in non-member 
states. Here then Pavel needs to resort to standard liberal argumentation and the jus cogens nature of 
fundamental rights: since all states have agreed on outlawing certain practices, everyone may intervene to 
enforce the norms protecting citizens against those practices. But if so, then the ‘divided sovereignty’ 
justification becomes superfluous: on this basis, Russia would be entitled to intervene in Myanmar, and the US 
could happily intervene in North Korea. Coercive international institutions would not be necessary. 
But even if the idea of coercion proves difficult to justify especially over those who have not been able to 
express their consent, it is nonetheless clear that some coercive acts by international organizations do take 
place. First and foremost among these are sanctions imposed by the Security Council. This used to be 
philosophically fairly straightforward: until the early 1990s, the UN imposed sanctions which would typically 
meet with two conditions: they would be imposed on member states, and would be imposed for violations of 
community norms, typically norms considered by many to represent jus cogens. This applied to the sanctions 
against Rhodesia and South Africa over Apartheid and related forms of discrimination; it even applied to Iraq 
over its use of aggression against Kuwait.   
A change of sorts started in the early 1990s, when sanctions were first imposed on not a member state, but a 
liberation movement, i.e. Angola’s Unita.21 Here, one cannot claim that the member state concerned was 
involved, in that Unita denied the authority of the state of Angola to represent the people, and it would be 
rather far-fetched to claim Unita would have consented to the authority of the Security Council. The same 
problem transpires with the smart or targeted sanctions that have been imposed ever since: their justification 
must reside somewhere else than in the consent of the state of which those individuals are nationals. 
This would not be too much of a problem if at least they could be justified in terms of jus cogens, but this is not 
unequivocally the case. Many of the coercive measure imposed have been imposed over allegations of terrorist 
involvement in one way or another, which can range from supplying terrorism suspects with regular goods and 
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services to financing their operations. Two broad comments are in order. First, while the global ‘war on terror’ 
undeniably received a boost after 9/11, it is not certain that terrorism is prohibited as a matter of jus cogens or, 
more accurately, that the sanctioned activities are themselves part of any jus cogens prohibition of terrorism. 
Most often, the sanctions target individuals whose involvement is usually mostly indirect – the targeted 
individuals are not themselves terrorists, most of the time. Now sociologically there can be all sorts of 
causation at work here, but the law is usually rather strict with causation (for better or for worse): imposing 
sanctions on someone who sent money to a relative who then uses it to buy supplies for suspected terrorists 
may make descriptive sense, but the law usually stops a few steps short of making such connections. 
The second comment is this: even if terrorism and acts surrounding it were prohibited as a matter of jus 
cogens, so too might be the rules that guarantee a fair trial and access to justice. So coercive measure might be 
justified, but their application ought to meet with fairly basic human rights standards lest the coercion itself 
becomes problematic. And the proposition that targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council meet with 
such standards is a proposition not even the Council’s greatest defenders would seriously claim.22 
Hence, while international organizations undoubtedly on occasion engage in coercive measures, the proper 
justifications for this remain problematic. Moreover, and more fundamentally still, it remains to be seen 
whether coercive measures are actually taken in the community interest. For, the entire claim rests on the 
possibility that one can meaningfully speak about community interests, as interests that cannot be reduced to 
those of a group of powerful states to be maintained against the wishes of those who disagree or who have 
different interests. This therewith raises a different kind of argument: how do organizations possibly contribute 
to the creation of the community interest?  
    
III. Promoting the Community Interest 
 
It is a truism – but a necessary one to repeat – that there is no such thing as a community interest in sheer 
isolation from particular interests. Put differently, community interests are a matter of epistemology, not 
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ontology, and are constructed by the relevant actors.23 It is here that international organizations play perhaps 
their most important role: in helping to shape the perception that something is, or is not, a community 
interest. If this is correct, it also follows that the ‘community interest’ need not necessarily be something 
widely embraced by the liberal community of international lawyers. Most international lawyers will associate 
the ‘community interest’ with such things as human rights protection or environmental protection, and with 
the type of activities often captured under headings such as jus cogens rules or erga omnes obligations – 
typically, international lawyers adhere to more or less cosmopolitan and liberal theories of global justice. Yet, 
such conceptualizations are far from automatically given: the ‘community interest’, lacking ontological roots, is 
an infinitely malleable concept. 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which organizations can contribute to the common interest, highlighted by 
generations of functionalist international lawyers and more recently by liberal institutionalist scholars as well, 
is by their very existence. Typically, organizations exist as platforms for discussion as well as instrumental 
entities that are supposed to ‘just do it’. Their creation reduces transaction costs and engenders stability, 
certainty and predictability. To the extent that they work on the basis of the ‘one state, one vote’ principle24, 
moreover, they can be seen as a step up from nineteenth century power politics, where smaller states just had 
to obey the commands of the Great Powers.25 And in being based on ‘one state, one vote’ they even suggest an 
affinitive link with democracy, however subliminal perhaps: how else to call the situation where the mighty US 
has as much to say as Lilliputian Liechtenstein? How else to characterize the situation where the giant and the 
dwarf are considered to be equals?  
So, organizations tick a number of cosmopolitan normative boxes merely by existing. Their presence stimulates 
quintessentially liberal values such as predictability and stability. In bringing states together, they conform to 
the old adage, colouring so much of international law, that ‘some agreement between states is always better 
than no agreement at all’.26 In being organized, for the better part and at least on paper, around ideas of 
sovereign equality, they make fleeting reference to democratic thought – a kind of democracy innuendo. 
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Obviously, there are also more tangible ways of formulating the community interest, for instance by adopting 
resolutions or other instruments. Here, organizations benefit from the circumstance that they are the agorae 
of the global community: the UN General Assembly in particular is the ‘town meeting’ of the world in a 
relevant, non-pejorative sense.27 It is the one platform where well-nigh all states come together on a regular 
basis; where all can have their say, and it is additionally a platform not hindered by a sense of having to 
accomplish things. Since the Assembly lacks legislative powers, it is not expected, normally, to be ‘effective’, or 
to engage in ‘crisis management’. Hence, much of the Assembly’s energy can go into shaping notions of the 
community interest.28  
Throughout the years, the Assembly has done much to shape and reshape the community interest. Its most 
famous attempt to do so was the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, sparking the 
human rights revolution and paving the way for the two UN Covenants and a host of other human rights 
related treaties concluded under auspices of the Assembly, ranging from the not terribly successful convention 
on the rights of migrant workers to the more recent convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. Later 
efforts have included such initiatives as the proclamation of a new international economic order, and various 
ways of trying to end poverty, first by proclaiming a right to development, later by focusing more on the plight 
of individuals by setting the so-called Millennium Development Goals.  
Likewise, and despite its more managerial mandate, the Security Council too has managed to elevate issues to 
matters of international concern and thus, perhaps, the community interest. One example was when it first 
adopted a resolution on HIV/Aids29; more recent examples include references to the Ebola virus in security-
dominated instruments.30 On the other hand, it is not implausible to claim that these were already recognized 
as ‘of international concern’, just not of concern to the Security Council – the politics of ‘framing’ looms large 
here.31 
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Much the same applies to other international organizations. As a general matter, their role as public platforms 
allows them to focus attention on whatever matter they see fit. Thus, not only does the protection of 
employees generally owe much to the work of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the ILO was 
instrumental more particularly in placing the connection between labour and migration on the political agenda. 
Maritime security and safety is among the general work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), but 
the IMO also raises specific matters to the international plane. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) is formally an entity of broad economic compass, but has recently helped to transform 
sovereign debt relief from a matter between debtor and creditors to a matter of community interest; and it is 
at least arguable that the concerted effort of the WHO and its then director-general Gro Harlem Brundtland 
have done much to construe tobacco consumption as a matter of international concern. That said, sometimes 
organizations also miss the proverbial boat: for all its effectiveness in placing labour and migration on the 
agenda, it remains curious that the ILO has done very little on the topic in recent years.32 Either way though, it 
is clear that organizations can contribute to the community interest in that they help to formulate how the 
community interest should be understood – they operate as norm entrepreneurs, both in placing items on the 
global political agenda, making them be seen as matters of community interest, and in providing the platforms 
for legal regulation.33  
Organizations sometimes also have other means at their disposal, means that may actually come to re-define 
the understanding of ‘community interest’ in more subtle ways. Perhaps the prime example here resides in the 
‘structural adjustment policies’ as advocated by the International Monetary Fund and implemented in bilateral 
loan agreements. Whatever else their effects, these have resulted in elevating a certain particularist way of 
looking at the economy and turned it into a universally adhered to set of economic values. More generally, the 
practices of the international financial institutions have contributed to a conception of the community interest 
as dependent on markets rather than states: they have helped to create and sustain the idea that economic 
values should prevail, and that the only – or at least most – relevant measure is the one of loss and profit.34 The 
so-called Washington Consensus was supposed to reduce inequalities within and between states and be 
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accompanied by basic human rights protection and respect for democracy, and eventually result in global 
peace, indeed eternal peace: often this was grounded in a (sometimes perhaps somewhat superficial) reading 
of the writings of Immanuel Kant.35  
Either way, much of what is generally seen as the community interest is the work of international 
organizations.36 The notion of ‘good governance’ rose to prominence within the UN Development Program; 
slogans such as that a ‘rising tide lifts all boats’ may illustrate the liberalization of trade sponsored by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)37; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has 
developed all sorts of initiatives on financial management and against corruption (and administers the Financial 
Action Task Force), and has recently even managed to give pride of place to global taxation. In doing so, it aims 
to promote the common interest but, importantly, a version of the common interest that is particularistic in its 
origins. And in doing so, it assists in legitimizing those particularist projects.  
In fact, it has been suggested, and rather cogently so, that organizations may sometimes create their own 
versions of the community interest, perhaps in order to prolong their own existence and raise their own 
relevance. A prime example is how the World Bank discovered ‘poverty’ as an issue of global interest (the word 
is absent from its Articles of Agreement), and later seized on the notion of ‘sustainable development’ and the 
necessity of ‘greening’ its operations and policies. These are examples of how the World Bank helps to 
construct (or reconstruct) the world around it in ways that cannot be captured properly by any principal/agent 
based theory, including the theory of functionalism.38 Other examples are not hard to come by either, and may 
range from the UN evolving from a collective security mechanism to a global welfare machine, having elevated 
such things as drugs control to a matter of community interest; or NATO changing from a self-defense alliance 
into a global police force after the demise of communism.   
Perhaps it is worth noting though that some of the most important issues stem not from formal international 
organizations, but from less highly institutionalized forms of cooperation, in particular the G20. If the OECD has 
managed to raise the profile of global taxation, it was the G20 who first adopted it under the somewhat 
euphemistic label of combatting Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). Other policy initiatives too may 
sometimes spring from the G20 and be further explored in other rather informal fora: sovereign debt relief, 
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e.g., is often associated not just with UNCTAD but also with the so-called Paris Club, a club predominantly 
composed of creditor states in order to help discuss debt relief of debtor nations but without a clear 
constitution, a clear mandate, or even clear rules on membership or decision-making beyond the injunction 
that decisions require consensus among the creditor states.39  This, incidentally, also exposes the risk involved 
in fragmenting the world into bite-size topics: while both UNCTAD and the Paris Club address sovereign debt 
relief, they do so in different ways, involving different actors, starting from different premises and resulting in 
different solutions.40 Or, put differently, different organizations may come to promote different versions of the 
community interest, even on what is broadly the same topic. 
It is, quite possibly, also telling that some of the generally accepted challenges of the day have hardly resulted 
in common action and are generally outside the mandates of any particular international organization. Poverty, 
migration and environmental justice are not within the more or less exclusive remit of any single organization, 
and neither is financial regulation. Some of these fall with the mandate of several organizations at the same 
time: combating extreme poverty, e.g., can be seen to be inherent to the work of the UN, driven by a coalition 
of poorer nations and thus coming with a welfarist tinge, as well as the financial institutions dominated by 
western states and generally driven by a market-orientation. It is not just the case that this results in 
coordination issues: it also comes with deep philosophical cleavages as to how best to engage in combating 
extreme poverty. 
Migration, by contrast, is largely the province of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), but this 
organization’s constitution formulates its mandate in terms almost diametrically opposed to a community 
interest: its brief is premised on guaranteeing the ‘orderly flow of migration movements’, according to the 
preamble of the IOM’s constitution, and the list of purposes of the organization also speaks predominantly in 
terms of what the IOM can do for its member states, as opposed to either migrants or the international 
community. This suggests, once again, that mere international cooperation, or mere institutionalization, need 
not necessarily serve a community interest: the community interest, it seems, must be distinguished from the 
collective interests of states. 
Financial governance may, to some extent, be in the hands of the financial institutions, but these essentially 
scrutinize the macro-economic policies of governments, and typically of governments in developing nations: 
                                                             
39 According to its website, the Paris Club is self-described as an ‘informal group of official creditors’ with 20 permanent 
members but allowing for ad hoc participation, where decisions are based on six principles. There seems to be no 
constituent document. See http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (last visited 26 August 2015). 
40 A useful discussion of some of the issues is Yvonne Wong, Sovereign Finance and the Poverty of Nations: Odious Debt in 
International Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012). 
they do not exercise much control or influence over the actions of central banks – or private banks - in 
developed economies. This is to some extent mitigated (if that is the right word to use) by the Basel Committee 
and its Guidelines on Banking Supervision, but these stem, once again, from an entity of debated legal standing 
and are themselves of debated legal status.41 
To sum up: international organizations can play a role in formulating the community interest, but are, first, not 
the only ones who can do so, and second, will often do so from their own vantage points: the community 
interest according to the WTO will look different, very different, from the community interest according to the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Indeed, there is increasing recognition of competition 
between organizations, not just over their proper turf42, but ideological competition. The above-mentioned re-
framing of HIV/Aids and Ebola as security issues already point in this direction: signifying some kind of 
competition between the UN and the WHO. But this can go further. Not very well-known is that a number of 
territories usually considered tax havens have set up the International Trade and Investment Organization 
(ITIO) so as to provide a counterweight to the OECD’s attempts to regulate global taxation.43 More visibly, 
China sponsored the creation, in 2015, of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a direct alternative 
to the existing western-dominated financial institutions. The point of these institutions is to offer ideological 
competitors - it is to offer different conceptions of the community interest. And while Darwinian optimists may 
predict that this eventually entails that the fittest conception of the community interest will prevail, others may 
wonder whether a conception that is fit enough to survive will be of much use to the community interest – or 
whether it will simply be a particularist project with stronger backing than its competitors. 
 
IV. Functionalism as Ideology 
 
                                                             
41 The Basel Committee is part of the Bank for International Settlements which, as public organizations go, has a checkered 
history (it used to have private shareholders), but is generally considered an international organization. Still, the status of 
the BIS as an international organization says nothing about the legal force of the guidelines adopted by the Basel 
Committee, and many agree that these are formally indeed at best, as their name suggests, guidelines, though exercising 
great authority. 
42 As is inherent in the co-existence of different bureaucratic entities. For some gruesome examples, see Hancock, Lords of 
Poverty. 
43 For brief discussion, see Peter Carroll and Ainsley Kellow, The OECD: A Study of Organizational Adaptation (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2011), 142.  
Friend and foe agree that international organizations law is dominated by a single body of thought, usually 
referred to as ‘functionalism’.44 Functionalism suggests, as outlined above, that organizations are created by 
member states to perform certain functions, and that since these functions are generally considered to be in 
the community interest, it follows that the law’s task is to facilitate the functioning of these entities.45 Hence, 
the law of international organizations places few (if any) limits on the reach of competences of international 
organizations; it allows organizations to admit, suspend, or expel member states with a view to its functioning; 
and it protects the functioning of organizations by all sorts of privileges and immunities. Moreover, it appears 
structurally unable to regulate control over international organizations by actors other than their own member 
states: since functionalism essentially organizes relations between the organization and its members, it has 
little to offer non-members, be they states, individuals, or civil society groupings.46  
Functionalist thought has a strong hold on the imagination: wherever a transboundary problem or issue is 
identified, there will be calls to set up an international organization to address the problem, either through 
discussion or by taking decisive action, of the sort that states cannot (or cannot be expected to) realize on their 
own, and with the community interest in mind. As one authority recently put it, discussing climate change: ‘… it 
is essential to devise stronger and more efficiently organized international institutions, with functionaries who 
are appointed fairly by agreement on national governments, and empowered to impose sanctions.’47    
If functionalism can be considered theory, it is somewhat uncertain what kind of theory it is supposed to be. 
From one angle, since no existing international organization has ever met with the ideal type set up by 
functionalism, there is room for the argument that it has fairly little descriptive or explanatory force, and it is 
perhaps no coincidence that commentators tend to be reluctant to refer to functionalism as ‘theory’.48 This 
                                                             
44 They may quibble about the precise extent of domination, but not about the domination as such. See, e.g., Guy Fiti 
Sinclair, ‘The Original Sin (and Salvation) of Functionalism’, (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law, 965-973. 
45 This is, obviously, not the only type of investigation possible, and some shift attention away from the investigation of 
international institutional law to the investigation of the social, political or legal relevance of international organizations. 
Fine examples include Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), and 
Guy Fiti Sinclair, ‘State Formation, Liberal Reform and the Growth of International Organizations’, (2015) 26 European 
Journal of International Law, 445-469. 
46 This is precisely why resort is had to a non-functionalist vocabulary in aiming to control organizations. The leading 
monograph is Eyal Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance (The Hague: Hague Academy of International Law, 2014).  I 
have addressed functionalism’s problems with control elsewhere: see Jan Klabbers, ’Theorising International 
Organisations’, in Florian Hoffmann and Anne Orford (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Legal Theory (Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming), and Jan Klabbers, ‘The Transformation of International Organizations Law’.  
47 The authority in question is Pope Francis, Encyclical on Climate Change and Inequality: On Care for Our Common Home 
(New York: Melville House, 2015) at 107. 
48 See Sinclair, ‘Original Sin’. See also André Nollkaemper, ‘Saving the Scarecrow’, (2015) 26 European Journal of 
International Law, 957-964. 
reluctance is strengthened by functionalism’s lack of precision: even if functionalism can predict that 
organizations may enjoy privileges and immunities, it cannot predict the precise extent thereof. Even if 
functionalism can justify admission or expulsion of member states, often political considerations overrule 
functional concerns.49 And even if it can predict that organizations may exercise implied powers, it is vulnerable 
to mood swings on the part of those who have to evaluate whether powers have been properly found and 
exercised.50  Moreover, functionalism has problems in actually identifying its own focal point: with many 
international organizations, it is not all that easy to specify what its main function or functions are, and much 
comes to depend on the level of analysis. Those who hold that the function of the EU is to achieve market 
integration in Europe are not wrong, but neither are those who suggest its function is to prevent war between 
Germany and France, nor even those who suggest its function is to achieve ‘ever closer Union’ – yet, these 
three different putative functions are capable of justifying radically different courses of action. Hence, in the 
end, the explanatory force of functionalism, while present in rough measure, is both limited and not very 
precise. 
As a result, it is tempting to view functionalism not so much as engaged with empirical reality, but rather with 
setting a normative standard, as normative theory or ideal theory, not unlike, say, Rawls’ theory of justice.51 
The point of functionalism is not that it can be verified or falsified; the point is, rather, that it has guided many 
generations of international organizations lawyers in telling them how to think about international 
organizations and to solve practical legal problems under reference to the function of the organization. In 
short, functionalism is a normative theory or, differently put, an ideology.52 While the term ‘ideology’ has fallen 
into disuse and is usually associated with Marxian social theory and considered pejorative53, one does not have 
to be a Marxist to recognize that ideas and rhetoric can help to legitimate power.54 While this is done quite 
                                                             
49 Alison Duxbury, The Participation of States in International Organisations: The Role of Human Rights and Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
50 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Changing Image of International Organizations’, in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen (eds.), The 
Legitimacy of International Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), 221-255. 
51 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971). 
52 For the rather sweeping claim that international law as such is ideology, see Shirley V. Scott, ‘International Law as 
Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and International Politics, (1994) 5 European Journal of 
International Law, 313-325. 
53 As Goldie puts it: ‘To expose a belief as ideological has generally been part of a strategy of exposing such a belief as 
false.’ See Mark Goldie, ‘Ideology’, in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), Political Innovation and 
Conceptual Change (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 266-291, at 267. 
54 For the various concepts of ideology in circulation, see the brief discussion in Susan Marks, The Riddle of All 
Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press, 2000), esp. at 9-10. My 
notion of ideology comes closest to the one Marks ascribes to Mannheim and his notion of Weltanschauung, with perhaps 
a sprinkling of Foucauldian thought for good measure, covering ‘a framework of beliefs, values and concepts’ defining ‘the 
outlook of … a social group’ - in this case, international institutions and international institutional lawyers. The Foucauldian 
directly by international organizations in their field of action (in the sense in which the World Bank’s ideology 
can be said to be neo-liberalism55), functionalism ‘doubles up’ the ideological nature of international 
organizations. Organizations espouse their own ideology, and the theory governing their operations further 
endorses the ideology associated with international organizations. If ideology is about presenting particular 
projects as universal56, then functionalism helps to do precisely this: it helps to present particular projects as 
universal, as being in the community interest, regardless of the particular project at issue.57 States may 
cooperate, e.g., to restrict migration – while this would not immediately be associated with any form of 
cosmopolitanism, when organized under auspices of an international organization (such as the IOM) the 
activity rapidly comes to be seen as somehow embodying a community interest. If states such as China or 
Russia individually fight against terror eyebrows may be raised and human rights concerns expressed; if they do 
so through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, however, things look far more respectable –it is precisely 
by being cast in the format of international organization that the activities become salonfähig.58 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
The present chapter has suggested that there are several ways in which international organizations contribute 
to formulating, maintaining and enhancing the community interest, but also that little of this is straightforward. 
Organizations can contribute to the community interest merely be existing and serving as a platform for the 
                                                             
sprinkling suggests that ideology needs to operate in tandem with actual mechanisms and techniques to be effective: see 
Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76 (London, Penguin, 2003, Macey 
transl.), 33-34. 
55 James H. Mittelman, Whither Globalization? The Vortex of Knowledge and Ideology (London: Routledge, 2004), esp. 47-
55.  
56 Marx and Engels held as much, but with the twist that the particular projects were projects of the ruling class, and the 
identity of the ruling class was clear. See the brief discussion in Susan Marks, ‘Introduction’, in Susan Marks (ed.), 
International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1-29, at 7. One does not 
need to adhere to conceptions about ruling classes to appreciate the point though: see, e.g. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955), at 80, pointing out that all politics contains elements of ideology, 
with the pursuit of power dressed up in other terms: legal, ethical, or otherwise. 
57 And it is hardly a coincidence that much praise is heaped on organizations in quasi-religious terms, such as Singh’s claim 
that they contribute to the ‘salvation of mankind’, and Claude’s analogy of swords and plowshares. It has been noted that 
ideology critiques become pervasive when religious doubt has set in: see Goldie, ‘Ideology’.  
58 Tapping into the idea of international organizations (and therewith the functionalist ideology) can have a powerful 
legitimating effect, starkly illustrated by Russian soldiers painting their helmets blue when intervening in Moldova in 1992, 
prior to UN approval. The episode is recorded by Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations 
Security Council (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 126. 
formulation of that interest. They can do so through coercion of member states or even others, although this is 
rare and not easy to justify. They can do so, more regularly, by developing ideas and consensus concerning the 
community interest and adopting documents to this effect or aspiring to this effect, and they do so, hidden 
from view but of great practical significance, by relying on the ideology of functionalism. Since the notion of 
community interest does not exist in isolation from particular projects, it always and by definition assumes 
someone pouring meaning into it. 
That is not necessarily a bad thing. Pejorative as especially the term ideology may sound, it derives its 
pejorative association not from any particular content, but from its very modus operandi: ideology tends to 
cover up political projects and present them in a different, more flattering light. Hence, even the claim that 
functionalism is an ideology is merely claiming that it works covertly: it does not suggest on its own that it 
would normatively be undesirable, and should not be taken as such. The term ideology is best seen as a 
methodological device for laying bare aspects of reality that otherwise remain hidden from view, without 
implying a further normative evaluation of those aspects. The point, then, is not to disavow international 
organizations or functionalism tout court, but rather to recognize international organizations for what they are: 
always someone’s political project, dressed up in terms of the community interest and operated by the 
ideology of functionalist thought. 
 
  
